SUMMARY
The military elites of many emerging nations are playing increasingly larger roles in the political development of their countries. It is the purpose of this essay to make some tentative judgments with respect to the role of the military elites of Pakistan, India, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand in the development of viable political processes.
Since World War II, large military forces have been established, equipped, trained, and deployed to deter or to fight aggression against each of the five countries. The armed forces of these nations have contributed indirectly, and in varying degrees, to political development through the conduct of military civic action programs.
While the military elite of India has remained in an essentially nonpolitical posture, the elites of the remaining countries have become directly and profoundly involved in domestic political activities. This intervention is attributable primarily to the failure of the civilian political leadership to cope with pressing internal and external problems and to the lack of cohesion within and between the civil elites. In each case the military elite was the only organized and disciplined group capable of establishing the conditions of order and stability conducive to economic, social, and political progress.
The present domination of domestic politics by the military in Thailand, Pakistan, South Korea, and South Vietnam is, hopefully, a condition which exists to be transcended. However, we must not expect these nations to conform in time to a Western model of democracy. At best, we can anticipate and advocate forms of democracy suited to the needs and capabilities of each country. The managerial and technical skills of the military elites and their control over the means of violence will continue to assure them of cardinal roles in the evolution of these political systems.
The United States should recognize these elites as significant elements of their societies whose competence is not limited to purely military matters. Under the aegis of the Military Assistance Program we should attempt to improve the quality of their contribution to political development in these areas:
(1) the achievement and maintenance of the politico-military proficiency necessary to provide an adequate defense against the manifold forms of subversion and aggression, and (2) the planning and implementation of military civic action programs with particular emphasis on basic citizenship and literacy programs and on the training of technicians to staff government and private institutions. Additionally, selected members of the elites should be prepared for their contingent employment in high level posts in government and in private life. Members of the academic community are in the process of developing strategies to describe and to measure the contributions, positive and negative, which the military have made and can make to the political development of the new states. Until these strategies are tested and refined, the literature on this subject must be confined to the formulation of hypotheses to be confirmed or refuted by the application of proven strategies to specific countries of the world. There is little consensus among political scientists as to the definition of viable political processes. Within the framework of this paper, viable political processes are considered to be those practices and mechanisms which enable a government in power to cope with the immediate political, economic, military, and social problems while developing, over the long run, the ability to respond effectively to popular or elitist demands for greater economic opportunity, increased social equality, and wider political participation. If such processes are to evolve and flourish in the developing nations, certain prerequisites must be met. Public order must be maintained and the nation made secure against aggression and subversion. 1. The elites exhibit a professionalism which impresses the civilian element of the population with its apparent promise of order and efficiency, its relatively dynamic approach to "getting things done," its ability to make decisions, and its adeptness at controlling mass organizations, albeit through the use of authoritarian methods.
2. The mentality of the elitist is characterized by a practical approach to problem solving, a bold assertiveness, and a belief in "doing" rather than in "thinking." In its extreme, this characteristic embraces anti-intellectualism.
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